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Abstract The LaSalle opinion ended doubts about the
continued existence of the new value exception to the absolute
priority rule. Reorganization plans that propose to issue securities
in exchange for new contributions can be crammed down, but
under stricter criteria. After LaSalle, new value plans must meet a
market test. Thus, LaSalle appeared to revolutionize the cram-down
process, forcing auctions in every new value plan. This Article
surveys the experience since LaSalle. The few cases that applied it
never ordered an auction or a true market test. Every plan
proposed by debtors was rejected. In cases where competing plans
were allowed, the choice among them was made by the court rather
than any market.
The experience with competing plans indicates that new
contributions of unique assets that will serve the debtor's strategy
may overcome objections. Pursuing the justification of the fresh
start policy, that bankruptcy law will prevent the incapacitation of
individuals' productivity, reveals the possibility of a narrow
exception to LaSalle's requirement of a market test for every new
value plan.
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Bank of America National Trust v. 203 North LaSalle Street
Partnership is a landmark in reorganization law, giving much needed
clarity to the "new value exception. "2 The opinion's outcome was
the survival of the new value exception, which agreed with a position
taken by this author and cited by the court.3  The LaSalle court
heightened the hurdle for the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization that utilizes the new value exception (i.e., a plan that
calls for the issuance of common stock in exchange for new
contributions). This Article revisits the new value exception to
examine the impact of LaSalle. Contrary to LaSale's apparent
mandate for auctions, no opinions report auctions in such a setting.
Instead, a new form of contested confirmations of new value plans
appears. This indicates that the pressing need for an improved
process for voting on new value plans continues unabated.
Using intervening research that stresses how bankruptcy law
revives productivity,4 this article also identifies a likely exception to
LaSalle. Exclusive new value plans should be allowed to address the
rare cases where the failure of a closely held corporation hamstrings
the productivity of the individuals behind it due to exclusive
contracts or non-compete obligations that block their capacity to
work outside the corporation.
The new value exception is a rule that applies in contested
reorganization plans. A plan is contested if it fails to receive
approval by every class of impaired creditors. The sequence of
events leading to this setting is that a claimant, often the debtor,
proposes a plan and one class of impaired creditors do not approve
of it by the required majorities. If the plan meets all requirements
2 Id.
3 Id. at 446 (citing Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, 3 STAN.J. L. Bus.
& FIN. 125 (1997)).
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy for Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 51
(2002) (stating: bankruptcy law consistently restores productivity that is incapacitated by
insolvency); NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW:
AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW (in Greek, H OtUCovojsut Av6Xnor 1 Tou
l-TloXcirruo Auctiou: EtoatyoyA OTqV OKovopsctm Avdu11) Ton Ataiou, 2000) .
' All classes of impaired creditors must approve a consensual plan, according to
§ 1129(a) (8). 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8) (2003). "With respect to each class of claims or interests
(A) such class has accepted the plan; or (B) such class is not impaired under the plan." Id.
(emphasis added). Creditors vote by classes to approve the plan. Id. § 1126. Each class must
approve the plan with two majorities, with an absolute majority by head count and with a two-
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of a consensual plan, listed in § 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
then the court can approve the plan, at its discretion, provided it
meets the requirements of § 1129(b), which are: (1) the plan must
not "discriminate unfairly"7 and, (2) it must be "fair and equitable,"
which includes meeting the "absolute priority rule.""
The "absolute priority rule" seeks to preserve the ranking of
creditors by seniority.9 Liens and subordination clauses establish the
order in which creditors would be satisfied in a liquidation (i.e.,
their seniority). The absolute priority rule gives each dissenting
class that is not paid in full the right to object against any
thirds majority by amount. Id. "A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been
accepted by... at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number ...." Id.
(emphasis added). Impaired creditors are those who are not restored to their position before
breach or bankruptcy. Id. § 1124.
[A] class ... is impaired .. unless ... the plan (1) leaves unaltered [its]...
rights.., or (2) notwithstanding any... provision.., that entitles... [it to]
accelerated payment ... (A) cures any such default ... (B) reinstates the maturity...
(C) compensates ... for any damages incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance
[on acceleration]; and (D) does not otherwise alter [its] .. .rights ....
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 1129(a).
Id. § 1129(b)(1). Unfair discrimination captures the notion that a plan cannot treat
classes of similarly situated claimants differently without justification. For example, a plan
that treats the deficiency claim of the main secured creditor vastly differently from other long-
term unsecured claims will fail this test. An ongoing relation, for example, with suppliers
justifies different treatment. See generally Denise R. Polivy, Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11:
Comprehensive Compilation of Current Case Law, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191 (1998).
8 Section 1129(b)(1)-(2) provides:
(b) (1) [1]f all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section other
than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the
proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the requirements of
such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with
respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable
with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i) (I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or
transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such
claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim,
of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such
holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property ....
11. U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1)-(2) (emphasis added).
9 See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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distribution to a class that is junior to it.' The effect of the rule is to
block plans that would violate the satisfaction of creditors by rank of
seniority. The most senior classes can use the rule to force complete
repayment of their claims (these classes are known as being "in-the-
money"). Since the debtor is insolvent, inevitably, a class will be
only partly in-the-money, and cannot extract enough value for its
complete repayment. All classes more junior than this last in-the-
money class are necessarily "out-of-the-money" in the sense that they
would not receive any value. Imagine that the debtor were
liquidated with a single transaction (i.e., the sale of the entire
business as a going concern. The proceeds would be exhausted by
the in-the-money classes). The absolute priority rule enables the
most junior in-the-money class to prevent the out-of-the-money
classes from getting value."
The new value exception is either an exception, or a corollary,
to the absolute priority rule. The reorganization plan can issue new
claims in exchange for new contributions to the reorganized firm.2
If such claims are issued to junior out-of-the-money claimants, the
question arises whether the buyers get more than equivalent
exchange. If so, the issuance may be a violation of the absolute
priority rule.
This Article proceeds by explaining the background of new
value plans in Part II. Part III explores the evolution of the law
regarding the absolute priority rule and the "new value exception."03
Part III.A. discusses the few cases that have tried to apply LaSalle's
directive for a market test of new value plans. Part III.B. explores
the source of the undesirability of new value plans that have not
been subjected to a market test, while Part III.C. argues that
untested new value plans could be justified to restore the
productivity of individuals. The Conclusion explores further
to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)-(2).
1 See id.
12 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
13 Some consider the "new value exception" as a corollary to the absolute priority rule,
despite that dominant usage calls it an exception. The question is one of semantics that
depends on how the rule of absolute priority is phrased. If it is phrased "creditors who are
not fully satisfied are entided to prevent claimants junior to them from receiving any value in
the reorganized enterprise," the new value rule is an exception because it enables junior
claimants to receive value. If the absolute priority rule is phrased as "claimants who are junior
to creditors who are not fully satisfied cannot receive any value on account of their claims," it
is a corollary because the value received pursuant to the proper operation of the new value
exception is received on account of the new contribution, not the pre-bankruptcy claim.
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avenues for developments of the law in this field, most notably the
need for a better scheme for voting on the confirmation of
reorganization plans.
I. THE LAW AND ENVIRONMENT OF NEW VALUE PLANS
The environment in which new value plans occur is shaped not
only by the law, but also by the coalitions that the reorganization
process of the Bankruptcy Code produces. Subpart A explains the
law and subpart B explains the coalitions.
A. Absolute Priority, the New Value Exception, and LaSalle
Whereas LaSalle altered the rule about the new value exception,
the existence of the new value exception depends upon the
existence of absolute priority. The narration must begin with
absolute priority.
The concept of absolute priority flows from the idea that the
many different stakeholders in a firm have different rankings,
depending on whether they are secured, ordinary, or subordinated
creditors, or, finally, equity holders.14  Creditors' different ranks
imply that some must be satisfied before others. If the rank of
creditors is violated when the firm's value is being distributed, their
priority, and the absolute priority rule, is violated.
The absolute priority rule, as a doctrine of U.S. reorganization
law, traces back to Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd. 5 A junior
1, 11 U.S.C. § 724(b) (establishing the priority distribution to holders of liens); see also
id. § 510(a) (stating that the distribution of the assets of the estate must respect subordination
agreements).
'5 228 U.S. 482 (1913). The facts of the case are confused by two railroad failures, Coer
D' Alene Railway and Navigation Co., ("Coer") and Northern Pacific Railroad ("NPRroad"),
an intervening fraudulent transfer, and the transfer of the claim at bar to Boyd. Boyd's
transferor's claim regarded labor and materials provided to Coer in 1886. Id. at 484. The
fraudulent transfer occurred through a transaction that today would be called a leveraged
buyout by NPRroad. Id. at 485. The over-leveraged company failed, and was bought in
foreclosure by Northern Pacific Railway ("NPRway"), a successor of NPRroad. Id. The
foreclosure proceeds were exhausted before junior creditors like Boyd were paid. Id. at 487.
Boyd's attack against the NPRway treated NPRway both as a successor of the transferee of the
fraudulent transfer and as a successor of Coer's shareholder. Id. at 484. NPRroad was that
transferee and that successor. Id. Boyd was vindicated under a theory that attacked NPRway as
a shareholder (i.e., under the theory that alleged Coer's shareholder received value before
Boyd in violation of the absolute priority rule). The new firm (NPRway) issued securities
reflecting a market valuation of $345,000,000.00, while only $61,500,000.00 was the winning
bid at the foreclosure, and Coer's secured debt was $147,500,000.00. Id. at 489-90. The Court
2003]
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creditor, Boyd, was ignored in a reorganization in which the old
equity holders retained a stake in the corporation. 16  This was a
violation of the junior creditor's absolute priority (i.e., his right to
be satisfied before the old equity holders received any of the failed
firm's value), and Boyd's claim survived against the reorganized
entity. 17  Creditors can attack distributions of value to claimants
junior to them.
The stage is ready for the entry of the new value exception. A
reorganization plan that leaves some creditors unsatisfied, issues to
the old shareholders some equity in the reorganized firm. The
unsatisfied creditors invoke the absolute priority rule against that
issuance.
The new value exception arose in a setting much simpler than
the several classes of claims contemplated by chapter 11. The
dissent of a tiny minority of even the only class of creditors would
hold up reorganizations if we were to adhere strictly to the absolute
priority rule. Creditors' contractual rights imply that they must all
consent to the amendment of their debt's terms in a reorganization.
Creditors who challenged this unanimity requirement triggered a
Supreme Court opinion by Justice Douglas, who served as
commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission and is, to
this day, one of the most respected corporate and reorganization
thinkers on the Court.8 In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,
Ltd.,' 9 Justice Douglas stated that the old equity can participate in
the reorganized firm despite the fact that dissenting claims are not
satisfied, provided the old equity purchases its participation with
consideration of "money or... money's worth, reasonably
equivalent" to the value received, which is substantial, and necessary
for a successful reorganization.20 This is the new value exception.
noted that the foreclosure was in effect a reorganization of Coer, in which the senior creditors
and the equityholders split the value of the firm, while dissenting junior creditors were not
paid in full. Id. at 503-06. "[I]f... a single creditor was not paid, or provided for in the
reorganization, he could assert his superior rights against.., the old stockholders in the
property transferred to the new company." Id. at 504.
16 Id. at 487.
17 Id. at 510.
Is See, e.g., Randolph J. Haines, The Unwarranted Attack on New Value, 72 AM. BANKR. LJ.
387,411 (1998).
308 U.S. 106 (1939).
I0 d. at 122. The debtor corporation's only asset was L.A. Shipbuilding and Drydock
Corp., which had under $1,000,000.00 of assets securing over $4,000,000.00 of debt to
bondholders. Id. at 109. In 1930, the debtor and ninety-seven percent in value of the
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The simplicity of the facts of Los Angeles Lumber may argue for a
narrow reading of the exception. There was only one class of
creditors, and ninety-seven percent (in value) of those agreed with
the 1930 reorganization.2 ' The dissenters were so few they seem to
hold up the reorganization using absolute priority as a tool. The
new value exception may seem intended only to counteract their
hold up power but the new contribution it required also meant that
absolute priority was preserved.
Even without the exception, the old equityholders could have
participated in the 1930 reorganization of Los Angeles Lumber.
Selling equity securities to the old managers could take place after
the reorganization was complete. This would imply that creditors
would have received the firm's residual value and would have
become shareholders. But the same result could be achieved by
having the reorganized firm merge with a shell corporation formed
by the old equity holders where, according to the merger
agreement, the reorganized firm's shareholders (the old debt
holders) would exchange their shares for debt in the merged
corporation.2 A group with majority (i.e., the creditors who support
the reorganization plan) could implement this transaction. The fact
that in Los Angeles Lumber the restructuring plan garnered the
support of the overwhelming majority of the only class of creditors
supports the new value exception. The same majority would be able
to produce the same outcome after a reorganization.
bondholders entered into a restructuring agreement, according to which the old shareholders
put new value into the enterprise and in exchange were released from liability and received
new common stock. Id. Nevertheless, the debtor failed again and went into reorganization in
1937. The 1937 plan created only two classes of securities, common and preferred stock. Id.
at 110. The bondholders received most of the preferred (some would be sold to raise working
capital) and the original shareholders got the common. Id. The going concern value was
$830,000.00, of which $811,000.00 would be received by the bondholders, constituting
approximately twenty-five percent of their claims. Id. at 112. Almost ninety-three percent of
the bondholders (in value) consented to the plan, as did virtually 100% of the old equity. Id.
at 110. But the old equityholders received their new equity stake without tangible
contribution of new value. Id. Dissenting bondholders claimed that this type of
reorganization was not within the "fair and equitable" requirement of the old Bankruptcy Act.
Id. at 112. The Court agreed, and Justice Douglas stated the conditions under which equity
may participate in reorganizations, a rule that has since been followed as the new value
exception. Id. at 132.
21 Id. at 109-10.
See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 251(b) ("The [merger] agreement shall state ... the
manner of converting the shares of each [merging corporation] into shares or other
securities... [of the resulting corporation] . ... ") (emphasis added).
2003]
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Therefore, no essential change was effectuated by the adoption
of voting for plans. A plan approved by all classes but one, that
must satisfy § 1129(b) and absolute priority, may be supported by
the absolute majority of the creditors who would be the post-
reorganization shareholders. From this perspective, the new value
exception economizes corporate procedure (i.e. the corporate
restructuring immediately after the reorganization that would be
necessary to issue equity to the old management).
Some doubts arose about the continued survival of the newS 24
value exception. Those were extinguished by the LaSalle opinion,
which created a new requirement for the approval of new value
plans. Rather than allowing the judicial determination of the
adequacy of the consideration, LaSalle imposes a market test:
[I] t would, of course, be a fatal flaw if old equity acquired or retained
the property interest without paying full value. It would thus be
necessary for old equity to demonstrate its payment of top dollar, but
this it could not satisfactorily do when it would receive or retain its
property under a plan giving it exclusive rights and in the absence of
a competing plan of any sort. Under a plan granting an exclusive
right, making no provision for competing bids or competing plans,
any determination that the price was top dollar would necessarily be
made by a judge in bankruptcy court, whereas the best way to
25determine value is exposure to a market.
In other words, the new value exception exists, but its use is
conditioned by competition that will ensure that the new value plan
does not give securities in the reorganized company of value greater
than the consideration paid. Thus, LaSalle requires a market test for
the approval of new value plans, and points to either competing
reorganization plans or an auction of the equity stake to be issued.
While the competition requirement might not seem a major
change, it is. Before LaSalle, new value plans routinely gave the
right to buy the new equity to specified buyers. If a plan gave the
old equityholders the right to buy equity in the reorganized firm,
23 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2003); supra note 5 and accompanying text; infra note 30; see
Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 161
(1999) (discussing the information and voting problems of chapter 11).
24 See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1990).
2 LaSalle, 526 U.S. 434, 457 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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that right tended to be exclusive. No other buyers were allowed to
outbid the old equityholders. Such plans would violate LaSalle.
To understand the new value exception, understanding LaSalle
is not enough. It is important to recognize that the law influences
group dynamics by requiring the existence of specific coalitions.
B. The Coalitions
Disputes about new value plans have two counter-intuitive
features. New value plans are only viable if equityholders have the
support of one creditor class. This also implies that the supporting
class has confidence in the management team.
1. The Equity-Creditor Alliance
The dispute over a new value plan involves at least three
groups, two of which must form a coalition. The three groups are
the equityholders who propose the plan, the class that opposes the
plan, and the class that must support the plan. New value plans
tend to be proposed by the debtor (i.e., the board of directors that
the old equityholders' elected, during the exclusivity period) 26 A
new value plan is only contested if it fails to be approved by every
impaired class.27 Therefore, at least one class must fail to approve
the plan. The plan must meet all remaining criteria of § 1129(a)
except approval.28  One requirement is that one class of creditors
must favor the plan.2 The plan must entice one class of creditors to
support it. By implication, the one supporting class also agrees to
the issuance of new equity under the plan's terms.0
26 The debtor has the exclusive right to propose a plan during the first 120 days after
filing and if a plan is submitted, no competing plan may be filed in the first 180 days. 11
U.S.C. § 1121.
Id. § 1129(a) ("The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements
are met: ... (8) With respect to each class of claims or interests (A) such class has accepted
the plan; or (B) such class is not impaired under the plan.").
Id. § 1129(b) (1). ("[11f all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) ... other
than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court .... shall confirm the plan... if
the plan does not discriminate unfairly" and follows absolute priority.).
Id. § 1129 (a) ("The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements
are met:... (10) If a class of claims is impaired... at least one class... that is impaired ...
has accepted [it] .... ").
One of the requirements for confirmation of a non-consensual plan is that at least
one impaired class does approve it. Id. § 1129(a)(10) ("If a class of claims is impaired under
the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan,
20031
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The support and opposition to the plan among classes triggers
the absolute priority rule. Unless the opposition is a dissenting
class, the plan is a consensual one, approved under § 1129(a) and
need not satisfy the requirements of § 1129(b), which include the
absolute priority rule.3 1 Dissenting creditors that are only a minority
of a class receive the lesser protection of § 1129(a)(7), which
requires that they receive no less than they would in a liquidation.2
Despite the lonely dissent of a few believers in the constant
perfection of markets, 3  liquidation value can be much less than
reorganization value. 4 Consider as an example, the case of a
reorganization during a crisis that causes bids for the firm to be at
sixty percent of its going-concern value, and for its assets at fifty
percent. If the firm has senior debt obligations equal to sixty-five
percent of its going-concern value, a junior creditor would not
receive any value in liquidation. The junior creditor who is in the
dissenting minority of a consenting class, is not entitled to any value,
regardless of the plan's allocation of value to the old equity.
Receiving the protection of the absolute priority rule makes a big
difference. If the class that includes the junior creditor dissents,
then it is entitled to thirty-five percent of the reorganized firm's
value before any value is distributed to the equity.
In the typical case, the equityholders are out-of-the-money and
would receive nothing in a reorganization. The ownership stake
they buy using the new value plan usually carries control of the
determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider.").
3, Id. § 1129.
32 Id. § 1129(a)(7). This section requires that:
With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests (A) each holder of a
claim or interest of such class (i) has accepted the plan; or (ii) will receive or
retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of
the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would
so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this tide on such
date ....
Id. (emphasis added).
" The principal example is Douglas Baird, who argues that reorganization law should
be substituted by a system of forced auctions of the enterprise as a going concern. Douglas G.
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 141 (1986) (favoring
elimination of chapter 11); see also Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 633 (1993).
The imperfections of actual markets mean that the sale of assets, or of the firm, could
produce proceeds that are significantly less than the value of the reorganized firm. See
Georgakopoulos, supra note 4, at 67-78 (explaining how such imperfections imply that a
reorganization procedure is necessary).
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reorganized entity, but deviations from this pattern are likely. It is
conceivable that the equity is in-the-money, but still uses the new
value exception to regain control because the plan exchanges debt
for equity (motivated, perhaps, by a desire to produce the safety of a
firm with low debt-to-equity ratio). Yet another possibility is that the
new value exception is used to give management a stake in the firm
that ensures management's commitment to the reorganized firm,
without giving management control. For example, a plan proposed
in September 2002 for the reorganization of Sunbeam, required
Jerry W. Levin, Sunbeam's Chief Executive Officer, to acquire a
small equity stake for $3,000,000.00.
35
2. Confidence in Management
A likely implication of the support for the plan of one class of
creditors, is that they have confidence in the resulting management
team. Indeed, the seminal cases on the absolute priority rule and
the new value exception concern the validity of the distribution of
equity to the old equity-holders who were also managers.3 6 The
interest of creditors in the old management is not surprising since it
serves them regardless of their position after the reorganization.
Creditors, who are converted into equityholders under the plan,
naturally want to see the firm prosper. Even if they retain their
capacity as creditors, they still have every interest in having the firm
prosper and service their claim.
II. NEW VALUE AFTER LASALLE
LaSalle established the rule requiring competition as a
condition of the use of the new value exception, in an environment
where the equity must form a coalition with a creditor class that has
confidence in management. The brief experience with the new rule
is instructive about its functionality.
n Martha Brannigan, Sunbeam's Reorganization Plan Will Change, in Bid to Cut Debt, WALL
ST.J., Sept. 8-9, 2002.




A. The Post-LaSalle Experience
Paradoxically, the experience after LaSalle does not include any
report of an auction or other method of a choice by the market.
Several cases are inept attempts that should offend the courts, such
as the pretense that the market test is met due to the arm's length
nature of a sale of the equity to the debtor's controlling
shareholder's daughter,37 or to a new corporation, organized by the
debtor's shareholders."
The cases that involve a colorable argument about the plan's
validity, still do not lead to a true market test. Instead of a market
test, in the one case that appears to have competing plans, the
choice between them is made by the court.3 9 By contrast, where
creditors asked the court to order an auction, the court refused.4
Even individual debtors have attempted to use the new value
exception since LaSalle.4' While in the case of corporate debtors the
new value is external to the corporation, in an individual
bankruptcy, unless the new value is a gift, its source is either the
estate-in which case it is not new, as in the case of borrowing
against assets of the estate-or postpetition income. One court
considered LaSalle applicable to reorganization plans of individuals,
requiring a market test for new value plans.2
The way in which courts assess new value plans has changed
qualitatively. Before LaSalle the courts expended much effort in
verifying that the new value plan would meet the Los Angeles Lumber
criteria of being "new," "in money or money's worth," "substantial,"
"necessary," and "reasonably equivalent." While the market test
seems to only address the last factor, it has dominated the others.
The criteria of Los Angeles Lumber might have been used to test a
plan's realism and the market test may force a realism that obviates
unrealistic plans and trivializes the old criteria. For example, a plan
may propose a contribution that is unnecessary for the
reorganization. The wasteful use of the new contribution makes this
plan likely to fail a market test.
37 In reGlobal Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000).
In reCGE Shattuck, L.L.C., 1999 B.N.H. 46 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999).
In re Situation Management Systems, Inc., 252 B.R. 859 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000).
See generally In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31.
41 In reDavis, 262 B.R. 791 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001).
42 •
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B. The Substantial Nature of Contributions
The pre-LaSalle experience with the substantial nature of the
new contribution is illustrative. An insubstantial contribution would
produce an excessively leveraged reorganized company, where the
creditors would bear much of the risk. A requirement that the
contribution be substantial perhaps could avoid this type of abuse
but was rarely applied to this end. Often courts would reject new
value plans by weighing the substance of the contribution, not
compared to the value of the reorganized firm, but compared to the
total unsecured claims.43 This metric, of course, is irrelevant for the
viability of the reorganized entity and the propriety of the plan. By
forcing distributions to out-of-the-money creditors, this application
of the requirement that the contribution be substantial, actually
aggravated the violation of absolute priority. Plans that gave more
value to out-of-the-money junior creditors were more likely to
succeed than plans that observed absolute priority. To the extent
that LaSalle cures this frequent erroneous application of the Los
Angeles Lumber test, it is a major improvement.
C. The Necessary Nature of Contributions
While studying the post-LaSalle plans, one should not overlook
two new value plans that were confirmed shortly before that
decision.44 They stand out because most plans follow a paradoxical
form. In most new value plans, the new value is distributed to
creditors, and often that distribution may be the inducement to
43 Several cases decided shortly before LaSalle elaborate the requirement that the
contribution be substantial. See In reARC Water Treatment, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1300, at *15-
16 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 1998) ("In determining whether an equity holder's capital
contribution is substantial, courts generally consider... the size of the contribution; its
relation to the amount of unsecured claims against the estate; its relation to the plan's
distribution to unsecured creditors; its relation to the amount of pre-petition claims... ."); In
re Pocono Springs Company, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 349 at *11 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 1998) ("In
making the determination of whether a new value contribution to a plan of reorganization is
substantial ... we have considered two factors: (1) whether the proposed payments under the
plan represents the best efforts of the partners or insiders of the debtor; and (2) the
percentage of the return on creditor's claims relative to the contribution."). The
interpretation of "substantial" as requiring the "best efforts" of the new equityholders allows
out-of-the-money creditors to block a reorganization plan with a $50,000.00 contribution by
top management. See id. at *13-14.
44 In re Beauchesne, 209 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1997); In the Matters of Treasure Bay
Corp., 212 B.R. 520 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1997).
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support the plan. As was explained previously, distributing the new
value to creditors violates absolute priority and does not make sense
if we believe that they are entitled to no more than the value of the
enterprise to which they lent. The distribution of new value is
additional value, beyond what creditors are entitled to under any
understanding of bankruptcy principles. Nevertheless, all pre-
LaSalle plans distributed the new funds to creditors.5 The necessity
of the contribution was routinely upheld because the plan would
also use the new funds to make distributions and pay expenses.
Paying expenses and making distributions provides no information
about the possibility of reorganizing without the new funds. The
application of the necessity requirement of Los Angeles Lumber was
irrelevant to whether the contribution was truly necessary in order
to effectuate the reorganization of the debtor. If the value of the
debtor would increase more from the contribution than the cost of
the contribution, any owner would make the cash contribution. If
the contribution was not in cash, however, the possibility arises that
the owner of the contribution is the sole entity that can acquire the
equity in a new value plan. This is illustrated in the two cases that
preceded LaSalle that do not have monetary contributions in their
new value plans.
The notable exceptions were the two plans where the new value
46was real estate. The Beauchesne case involved an individual's new
value plan.47 In an estate of a few million dollars, the contribution
consisted of $30,000.00 in cash and of a parking lot valued at
$15,000.00, both contributed by the debtor's wife s.4  The Treasure
Bay plan was much more substantial, involving a casino with a value
of $35,000,000.00, 49 and new contribution of $4,500,000.00 in cash
and $4,500,000.00 in real estate. °
The Treasure Bay case, stripped of some detail, involved
Treasure Bay Corporation which borrowed $115,000,000.00 and
45 See Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, supra note 3, at 151-55.
In re Beauchesne, 209 B.R. 266; In the Matters of Treasure Bay Corp., 212 B.R. 520.
47 In re Beauchesne, 209 B.R. 266.
48 Id. at 269.
4' Alternative valuations included $23,000,000.00 by the expert of the opponent of the
plan, and $53,000,000.00 according to the expert of a creditor supporting the plan who used
an 11.5% discount rate to value the casino. In the Matters of Treasure Bay Corp., 212 B.R. at
544.
. Id. at 525.
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granted first liens in all assets to secure its indebtedness.5' It was also
indebted to ongoing service providers and to other unsecured
creditors.5 ' The most vocal unsecured creditors were Anderson, a
construction contractor, and Santa Fe, a terminated casino
management company. 3  The value of the debtor's business was
estimated at $35,000,000.00, and two competing plans were filed,
one by the equity supported by the secured creditor, First Trust, and
a second by Santa Fe, supported by Anderson.54
Under the debtor's plan, the secured creditor would keep the
lien and a note for $27,250,000.00, waive the unsecured deficiency
claim of the secured creditor, pay the ongoing service contractors
100%, and give ten percent of the equity to the secured creditor.
5
With a $9,000,000.00 contribution the old equity would buy ninety
percent of the equity in the reorganized firm.5  The $9,000,000.00
was new contribution, half in cash and half in real estate.57 The plan
also provided an option for the reorganized debtor to purchase
more real estate, an election to make five $432,000.00 debt
payments as "payments-in-kind" by issuing more debt, and the ability
to borrow $2,250,000.00 more from First Trust.
5
The Santa Fe plan would give new first mortgage notes to the
secured creditors with a value of about $20,000,000.00, pay
contractor's (allegedly secured, but out-of-the-money) claims
$6,000,000.00, and issue new equity in exchange for $10,000,000.00
in cash. 59 Unsurprisingly, the court found that the plan was unfair
5 Id. at 526.
52 Id. at 525.
53 Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 525, 535.
"5 Id. at 524.
% Id.
57 Id.
" Id. at 538-39.
Id. at 535. The opinion does not specify the additional payments that the plans would
make. If both plans distributed all the cash, the remaining value of the reorganized
enterprise according to the debtor's plan would be higher by the $4,500,000.00 of the real
estate contribution. Id. at 545. We can estimate the total "liabilities and equity" of the
resulting balance sheet by keeping in mind that the only significant debt would be to First
Trust. Adding to the equity the $27,250,000.00 obligation to First Trust, produces a total of
$37,250,000.00. If the asset side of this hypothetical balance sheet contains matching values,
then we can also simulate the one corresponding to the Santa Fe plan. A subtraction of the
contributed real estate, leaves the Santa Fe plan with a debtor with assets of $32,750,000.00,
with $26,000,000.00 of secured obligations, and remaining equity of $6,750,000.00 for which
the plan proponents pay $10,000,000.00. Rather than appearing as an unappealing bargain,
20031
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL
to First Trust and rejected the planY.60 As an additional source of
unfairness, the court discussed Santa Fe's purchase of unsecured
claims at 100%, while they could not receive a 100% distribution.6
The plan was also held to discriminate unfairly against the
deficiency claim of First Trust, to which it paid nothing.
6 2
The striking difference of Beauchesne and Treasure Bay from
every other new value case, is that they do not distribute the real
estate contributions to the prepetition creditors. Thus, these
contributions actually function as contributions even when seen
from the side of the reorganized debtor, unlike every cash
contribution which is used to pay prepetition claims. The Treasure
Bay case is also remarkable in the importance of the real estate
contributed for the reorganization of the debtor. The court noted
the increased competition in the area, and that the contributed real
estate would connect the casinos and enable the debtor to upgrade
its facilities to face the competition.
63
The experience of a post-LaSalle "market test," decided by the
court choosing between competing plans, combines with the pre-
LaSalle experience of the soundness of real-estate contributions.
The combination suggests that the contribution of unique tangible
property that is important for the operation of the debtor may hold
the key to a successful contest between plans. Indeed, the
contribution of cash can arguably never be "necessary" for the
reorganization of the debtor. If the cash is distributed to the
creditors it violates absolute priority. If the cash is used to pay
operating expenses, the debtor is not profitable as an independent
entity, and is likely to become insolvent again, thus failing the
corresponding test of § 1129 (a) (11).64
we must realize that the plan proponents also receive the secured treatment of $6,000,000.00
of claims. Excluding the $6,000,000.00 repayment, their net contribution is $4,000,000.00.
Receiving $6,750,000.00 in exchange for it does indeed correspond to a bargain.




11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2003). This section requires that "[clonfirmation of the
plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial
reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such
liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan." Id.
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D. The Undesirability of Untested New Value Plans
Labeling a type of new value plan as "abusive" is conclusory
because the label neither reveals its consequences nor evaluates
them. Interpretations of the new value exception may allow certain
types of plans. The desirability of an interpretation depends on the
consequences of the plans that turn on it. If a type of plan does not
diminish social welfare, it is difficult to argue that the interpretation
that allows it is undesirable. That a type of plan does reduce social
welfare supports an interpretation precluding such plans. The
typical "abusive" new value plan would have negative consequences,
because it would impose costs on lenders without producing larger
65gains for borrowers. A new value plan without a market test would
give control to the equityholders and let them try their
entrepreneurial luck again, to test one more business idea. The lack
of a market test may also burden the firm with too much debt or
render it insolvent. In the rare cases where the equityholders' new
business attempt succeeds, the debt is fully satisfied. In most cases,
additional funds will have been expended in the additional gamble
with the result that a subsequent liquidation would produce less
value for creditors. Such permissive use of the new value would
reduce the satisfaction of lenders' claims leading to greater interest
rates with no countervailing benefit.
An example illustrates the waste. Suppose that debtor
corporation is insolvent in both the balance sheet and cash flow
sense. Its assets produce earnings of $1,000,000.00 per year,
meaning that, if the appropriate discount rate is ten percent, then
the firm has a value of $10,000,000.00 as a going concern. The same
assets sold in liquidation would produce $5,000,000.00. A credit
crunch hampers bidders for the entire firm, making reorganization
clearly desirable. The insolvency means that the creditors should
obtain all the value of the debtor. Instead, the old equity holders
propose a new value plan according to which, for a payment of
$100,000.00 which is spent on expenses they obtain 100% of the
equity in the reorganized firm, subject to debts to creditors with a
face value of $10,000,000.00. The new financial structure contains a
paradox. The firm is still worth $10,000,000.00, making it
impossible that debtholders receive 100% of the firm's value. The
0 This is the standard method of assessing bankruptcy interpretation. See, e.g.,
Georgakopoulis, supra note 3, at 147-56.
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equity cannot have no-value. The equity must have some value not
only because the old equity holders were willing to buy it, but also
because it can only gain from future uncertainty. Debtholders
experience the opposite effect, since they can only lose from
uncertainty.
Prospective lenders react to the prospect of receiving less than
$10,000,000.00 in liquidation by reducing their willingness to lend.
Charging higher rates could compensate for this risk, perhaps even
for the exposure to repeated new value plans. The higher rates
hamper business creation, however. Society gives up the creation of
new businesses (and additional national product) in exchange for
not changing the controller of an existing business. Since society
experiences no gain by keeping the original controller, it gives up
growth potential for no compensating reason. Such bankruptcy law
would be a recipe for economic stagnation. The sequences of cases
that culminate in LaSalle are desirable.
E. Mobilizing Productivity of Individuals
In examining the consequences of bankruptcy doctrine, we
must not forget the effect on individuals. The leading case justifying
the fresh start policy, Local Loan v. Hunt,66 justifies the fresh start as a
measure against pauperism and idleness.6 ' Essentially, individuals
under crushing debt have no incentive to be productive because
their productivity only benefits creditors. The fresh start restores
their productivity incentives.
If prohibiting new value plans causes pauperism and idleness,
an argument in favor of new value plans is formed. The typical new
value case does not leave room for such an inference. If the debtor
firm is owned by passive investors, who are not involved in its
management, the passing of control imposes pauperism on no
292 U.S. 234 (1934).
67 Id. at 245.
From the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not
earning at all and earning wholly for creditor. Pauperism may be the necessary
result of either.... The new opportunity in life and the clear field for future
effort, which it is the purpose of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated
debtor, would be of little value to the wage earner if he were obliged to face the
necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable portion of his earnings for an
indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebtedness incurred prior to his
bankruptcy.
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individual. The creditors will seek to maximize the value of the
firm, and if employing the same management team is the way to do
that, they will. The equity holders (limited partners) in LaSalle were
68passive investors.
Active involvement in the business by the equityholders does
not defeat the above economic analysis. The change in control may
leave them without jobs, but it does not destroy their future
productivity incentives. In some cases, the result of the change of
control is an increase of the productivity of the debtor. A
representative example is the single-asset real estate firm, owned
and run by a clumsy heir who drives it into insolvency. As a real
estate manager, the clumsy heir leaves a lot to be desired. Being
forced to seek other employment would force the erstwhile
manager's labors in what is demanded by the market while the new
controller of the real estate would appoint a manager with true
managerial skills. The change of control relieves society of the
heir's poor management. Rather than destroy wealth by continuing
the inept management of real estate, the change of control forces
the heir into an activity where she creates value. Rather than
immobilize skill, LaSalle's application mobilizes it.
F. Exceptional Cases of Freezing Productivity by Obligations not to Compete
Oddly, the limits of the new value policy are illustrated in a case
regarding executory contracts. Ordinarily, the rejection of an
executory contract seeks to produce the effects of a breach.
Proposals have sought to use the "breach" languagei 9 A study of
puzzles of rejection case law hints at a latent issue of disabling the
productivity of individuals (i.e. the concern behind the fresh start).
70This arose in the rejection of obligations not to compete.
Debtors who are subject to obligations not to compete cannot
avoid them by declaring bankruptcy and rejecting the contract with
the clause barring competition. The consequences of rejection are
those of a breach, and a breach by the obligor does not convert the
LaSalle, 526 U.S. 434, 438 n.2 (1999).
See National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report, General Issues in Chapter 11,
Recommendation 2.4.1, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/12chapt
.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2004) ("The concept of 'rejection' in section 365 should be replaced
with 'election to breach.'").
70 In reRegister, 95 B.R. 73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).
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obligations not to compete into a claim for damages.7 The obligee
has an injunction against violations of the non-compete obligation.
The injunction survives breaches of the contract by the obligor.
The case with which many relate is the bankruptcy filing and
rejection attempt by actress Tia Carrere; having a lucrative offer to
play for "the A-Team," Carrere sought to avoid the non-compete
obligation she undertook as part of her contract to join the cast of
General Hospital.
7 2
Nevertheless, courts allow the rejection of some obligations not
to compete. Those rejections tend to match the justifications of the
fresh start. The example of the Registers stands out.73 They were a
couple who held a franchise and who in the franchise agreement
made a valid promise to the franchisor not to compete after the
termination of the relation.74 In bankruptcy, they were allowed to
"reject" the obligation not to compete.5
Allowing debtors like the Registers to reject their non-compete
obligations has the expected negative effect on creditors, but it also
has the effect of restoring the debtors' productivity incentives. If
the debtor is inept at the business of the franchise, the franchisor
and creditor would benefit from replacing the inept franchisee. If,
however, the debtor is skilled but unlucky, the non-compete
obligation prevents society from enjoying the product of the
debtor's labor. Allowing the rejection of the non-compete
obligation means that the debtor will again be able to devote his
efforts in the occupation where they are most productive. The
rejection restores to the national product the debtor's maximal
productivity.
The rejection of obligations not to compete may involve a
compromise related to the compromise of the fresh start policy.
Just as the fresh start policy imposes costs on creditors but restores
debtors' productivity incentives, so the rejection of obligations not
to compete imposes costs on obligees but restores the productivity
71 11 U.S.C. § 3 65 (g) (1) (2003); see a/soJesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance
Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DuKE L.J. 517, 519 (1996) ("[R]ejection is treated as a pre-
bankruptcy breach.... .").
12 In reCarrere, 64 B.R. 156, 157 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
73 In re Register, 95 B.R. 73-74.
74 Id. at 74.
75 Id.
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of some obligors. New value plans provide a solution similar to
rejection in some analogous cases.
G. Exceptional Cases of Freezing Productivity by Blocking New Value Plans
Settings related to new value plans can raise issues of restoring
individuals' productivity, analogous to In re Register and Local Loan v.
Hunt. New value plans may restore individuals' productivity, while
the application of LaSalle's market test would preclude them. A
setting that produces this effect is one where one or more
individuals conduct an expertise-based business through a
corporation to which they have granted obligations not to compete.
When the corporation finds itself in bankruptcy, only a new value
plan can allow the individuals to continue applying their expertise
while also giving creditors a stake in their future. An example
illustrates.
As an illustration, consider an expert on an arcane topic, who
provides journal columns to magazines through a corporation. The
columns might be analogous to columns on wine tasting or the
game of bridge. The corporation has exclusive contracts with half
the magazines or other publications that may publish such columns.
The other half has the same arrangement with the expert's only
competitor. The corporation is forced into bankruptcy. The equity,
held by the expert, proposes a new value plan. If the LaSalle rule
were to impose an auction of the equity in the new value plan, the
likely buyer would be the competitor. After the competitor acquires
the corporation, the competitor will invoke against the expert the
obligation not to compete with the corporation. The strict
application of LaSalle reduces the expert's productive capacity.
A new value plan without a forced auction provides a superior
outcome. The expert retains a controlling interest in the firm and
can continue applying his expertise. This appears to be a deviation
from LaSalle, but it is justified due to the effects on individual
productivity. Cases threatening the elimination of individual
productivity as a consequence of an auction of the debtor's equity,
are distinguishable from LaSalle.
In summary, LaSalle correctly eliminates reorganization plans
that use the new value exceptioD in a way that harms society.
However, the possibility exists that new value plans are the only
means to restore the productivity of individuals for whom the
debtor is a corporate front. Such cases should be distinguished
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from LaSalle, a new value plan should be allowed without an auction
of the equity.
III. CONCLUSION: RENOVATING THE NEW VALUE EXCEPTION
The puzzle with the new value exception is that it must serve
two very different functions. While it must prevent creditors from
holding up unlucky entrepreneurs, it must also prevent the
perpetual control of failed firms by inept businesspeople. To do
both, the new value exception must show two very different faces. A
legislative straight-jacket cannot fit both. The courts' equity powers,
so important in every other aspect of bankruptcy law, must be relied
upon in this area as well. It remains to be seen if LaSalle leaves
enough room for balancing according to equity. The initial
experience of no market tests and no confirmations of debtors'
plans will hopefully change, and allow a more nuanced evaluation of
the evolution.
The fact that secured creditors are still purchasing unsecured
76claims at one hundred cents on the dollar, and propose plans that
distribute value to out-of-the-money unsecured creditors, indicates
that absolute priority is still violated. The requirement that one
class must approve any plan forces secured creditors to propose
plans that make distributions to out-of-the-money unsecured
creditors. Either the cram-down requirement of approval must
change to accommodate plans proposed by secured creditors or the
voting of all stakeholders must be replaced so as to emulate the
voting of the reorganized firm's shareholders (before the new value
contribution).
Thus, we could expect a transition toward a regime in which
the reorganization must anticipate the reorganized firm's capital
structure. After an appraisal of the firm's value as a going concern,
the senior creditors would retain the creditor position as far as the
usual capital structure in the industry permits. As creditors of the
reorganized firm, they would not vote. The senior's deficiency
claims, and the progressively next most senior creditors would stand
to become the shareholders of the reorganized firm until its value is
exhausted, and those should be the only ones voting. More junior
"6 The secured creditor purchased the claims of all of the out-of-the-money outsider
creditors in In re Waterville Valley Town Square Assoc. 208 B.R. 90, 93 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1997).
The court refused to allow an auction of the equity and rejected the plan. Id. at 99-100.
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out-of-the-money stakeholders should be excluded. The resulting
vote would approximate the vote of the shareholders of a
reorganized firm without the new value contribution, and their vote
should determine the new value exception just as their vote would
determine whether the reorganized firm would perform the
equivalent transaction of merging with a shell corporation created
by the old equity holders.7 This scheme would allow negotiated
contributions that would be unassailable because they would
simulate the non-bankruptcy corporate combination that the new
value exception mirrors. A transition to such a voting scheme would
effectively end concerns about the new value exception and all the
problems that § 1129 raises. The egregious single asset cases would
not be reorganizable without the secured creditor's consent because
the secured creditor would control the vote.
This austere scheme, however, is only advisable for
bankruptcies that are neither part of a bubble and crash cycle, nor
bankruptcies that trigger fresh start concerns. For a firm's failure to
raise fresh start issues, it must not simply be family owned but the
family owners must also face a restriction against applying their skill
outside the corporation. Only then does a concern arise about
wasting the debtor's potential contribution to economic life. Courts
must show great skepticism when approaching fresh start claims in
the context of the new value exception, never forgetting that they
would be exceeding the conventional venue of the fresh start which
is limited to the discharge of monetary debts. The leniency of debt
discharge is enough to avoid waste by restoring the production
incentives in most debtors. Only if the setting of the failed
enterprise is such that the individuals will waste their abilities if the
enterprise fails-because they cannot employ their skills, as is the
case with debtors having obligations not to compete7s-will the fresh
77 It is important to recognize that the result of the new value plan of giving equity to
the old equityholders without first satisfying junior creditors, can be achieved in a two step
transaction that obviates the new value exception. First, the reorganized entity emerges from
bankruptcy with the senior creditors having control. Then, the senior creditors merge the
reorganized firm with a token corporation created by the old equityholders. The old
equityholders exchange their shares in the token corporation for shares in the reorganized
firm. This equivalence was discussed in Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, supra note 3,
at 131 n.16.
Obligations not to compete might be undertaken too easily, pursuant to an
overoptimism bias, as explained further in Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, supra note
3, at 159-64. While presently this may be the only obvious market failure that wastes debtors'
skills, others may appear. The new value exception can then be used to accommodate
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start concerns argue for allowing the family owner to maintain
control over the failed firm by virtue of the new value exception.
Therefore, in order to use the new value exception so as to
assist the fresh start, the court must not only be convinced of the
good faith failure of a family-owned firm and its owners, but also of
the waste of the owners' skills. If either the skills or the waste are
not in prospect, no reason for an untested new value exception
exists, but if the court accepts that the fresh start policy argues for
continued control of the firm by this debtor, then the example of In
re Whittaker Memorial Hospita[9 can be followed.8 0 The fresh start
motivated untested new value exception provides entrepreneurs a
laudable incentive scheme. Since the new value exception will be
applied to entrepreneurs that show that they were not simply
unlucky but that they are able and in a unique position to use their
abilities through their firms, it gives them an incentive to
demonstrate that they will excel. Furthermore, it gives them an
incentive to invest in education and in customizing their business, in
finding niches, and developing and serving new markets. The
entrepreneur must show that she will be missed.
Compared with the elaborate and artificial structure of § 1129,
these proposal are simple and straightforward. The peculiar and
questionable activities that § 1129 have given rise to, such as claims
trading, impairment negotiations, and classification games,"' will be
substituted with the substantive efforts on the part of the equity
holders to show ability in running the firm and on the part of the
creditors to show ability to take control of the firm. Errors are
inevitable, but even if the courts are inaccurate in applying these
rules, they would be a dramatic improvement over the current
jumble of activities around § 1129.
debtors who suffer from those errors as well.
79 149 B.R. 812 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
Wo Id. at 816-17 (approving new value plan); see also Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh
Start; supra note 3, at 155-59.
81 See, e.g., Polivy, supra note 7.
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